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Abstract
This paper combines and develops the models in Lastrapes (2002) and Mankiw & Weil
(1989), which enables us to analyze the effects of interest rate and population growth shocks
on housing price in one integrated framework. Based on this model, we carry out policy
simulations to examine whether the housing (stock or flow) tax reduces the housing price
fluctuations caused by interest rate or population growth shocks. Simulation results imply
that the choice of housing tax tools depends on the kind of shock that housing market faces.
In the situation where the housing price volatility is caused by the population growth shock,
the flow tax can reduce the volatility of housing price while the stock tax makes no difference
to it. If the shock is resulting from the interest rate, the policy maker should not impose
any kind of the housing taxes. Furthermore, the effect of one kind of the housing tax can
be strengthened by that of the other type of housing tax.
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1. Introduction
At the end of 1999, the Chinese government basically canceled the housing benefit distri-
bution system (Fu-Li-Fen-Fang in Chinese), and then the market-oriented housing system
began to take shape, eventually leading to the boom of the housing market. The Chinese
people have suffered a lot from the continuously rising housing price. To curb the fast rising
of housing price, on November 28, 2011, Shanghai and Chongqing in China became the
first two that were officially chose to impose housing tax on individual house. However, the
housing prices are still rising, which leads to the question: Do housing taxes work? There
are many scholars focusing on this issue, but arriving at opposite conclusions. Some find
that the housing taxes can help reducing the growth of housing price [1, 2, 3], while others
think that the housing tax policies lead to the rising of housing price [4, 5].
In our opinion, the different conclusions may result from the fact that there are sundry
sources driving the housing price, such as money issues [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], population factors
[6, 10, 11, 12], etc. Since the present paper considers a China issue, we first summarize the
main sources that drive the house price dynamics in China from the existing literature and
then take the main factors into account in one framework.
There are various explanations for house price movements in China, among which popula-
tion factors and monetary policy shocks are widely considered. The former attributes house
price movements to changes in population, which are mostly fueled by the changing number
of men in the marriage market [e.g., 13], and rural-urban migration and urbanization [e.g.,
14]. In more detail, incorporating specific features of the Chinese economy, the way that the
population affect the house price can be explained as follows. First, from the end of 1999,
the market-oriented housing system in China began to take shape. After that, the changing
population can affect the housing price dynamics through influencing the housing demand
in the residential housing market. With this housing market reform, a huge demand for resi-
dential housing has been released, and as a consequence the housing price has increased a lot
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during the last decade. Second, the Chinese parents with a son want to pursue a bigger and
more expensive house/apartment in a competitive manner to improve their son’s relative
attractiveness for marriage, which is a popular phenomenon in current Chinese society. As
a result, the increasing number of men who are in marriage ages makes a large effect on the
housing prices. Wei et al. [13] assume that housing is a status good in the Chinese marriage
market and test its consequences for house prices. This work finds empirical evidence to
support this hypothesis, and further an increase in the sex ratio resulted in 30-48 percents
of the rise in urban house prices in China during 2003-2009. Third, big cities in China
(like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou) receive a large number of migrants from inland
provinces due to their rapid economic growth and employment opportunities and hence face
greater pressure in the urban housing demand. Rapid urbanization process in China causes
a dramatic rising in the urban population, which also leads to more housing demand. Chen
et al. [14] examine the possible effects of rural-urban migration and urbanization on housing
prices of the cities in China, and find that the different urbanization levels and the migra-
tion situations have significant effects on the Chinese urban house prices. In conclusion,
population factor related to market reform, marriage, and migration/urbanization is one of
the most important factors in explaining the dynamics of housing prices in China.
As for the role of monetary policy shocks, many scholars argue that China’s monetary
policy actions are the key driving forces behind the increase of housing price in China. Us-
ing a non-linear modeling approach, Zhang et al. [15] study the sources of housing prices
movements in China, and find that monetary policies may be the key factors influencing
house prices in China. Xu and Chen [16] examine the impact of key monetary policy vari-
ables, including long-term benchmark bank loan rate, money supply growth, and mortgage
credit policy indicator, on the real estate price growth dynamics in China. Empirical results
consistently demonstrate that lower interest rate and loosening mortgage down payment
requirement can help to accelerate the growth of housing price, and vice versa. Zhang [17]
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explores the causal relationship among the interest rate, house price inflation and consumer
price inflation in China since 1998 through a standard multivariate dynamic model, and
states that the recent housing market boom results from the low interest rate in China.
These papers all suggest that the monetary policy actions of the Chinese government are
the key drivers behind the fluctuations of the house price growth in China.
Therefore, for different sources that drive the housing price, will the effects of housing
tax tools be different? In order to answer this, we combine and develop models in Lastrapes
[7] and Mankiw and Weil [11] to consider both the interest rate and population growth in
one framework, and take the housing stock and flow taxes into consideration.2 Intuitively, if
the housing boom is caused by the loose monetary policy, then the recently adopted policy
packages aimed at the housing market should be focused on monetary policy tools, and in
consequence the tax instruments may not be good measures to stabilize the house market.
However, in the case where the driving force of the housing market is the population factor,
the housing tax may slow down the rising of the housing market as the household would
choose to rent instead of to buy a new house or delay the demand for the house. As a result,
the effect of the housing taxes may depend on the driving force of the housing market.
The main contributions of our work are as follows: we propose a theoretical model and
carry out simulations to answer the questions mentioned above, which can also be used for
other policy analysis; we conclude that the effect of housing tax depends on what shock (in-
terest rate or population growth shock) the housing market is affected by, which will provide
new insight into the current research on housing tax in China. In what follows, Section 2
sets up the model, Section 3 presents the simulation results, and Section 4 concludes.
2Lastrapes [7]’s work considers the effect of money supply on housing price, while Mankiw and Weil [11]’s
model only takes population growth into account.
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2. The Model
In this paper, we propose a partial housing market equilibrium model, which includes
housing demand and supply equations. The housing demand equation is derived follow the
work of Lastrapes [7], and the supply equation draws the model in Mankiw and Weil [11].
As a combination, our model takes the population growth and interest rate into account.
Let Nt be the population in the economy, Ht be the aggregate stock of housing, and qt
be the real housing price. First, we derive the housing demand equation. Assume all the
people are homogeneous, and face the same choice. Let an aggregate consumer represents
the whole population, and maximize the intertemporal objective function:
V0 =
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Ht) (1)
where Ct is non-housing aggregate consumption, and β is the discount factor. The consumer
maximizes its utility subject to:
At+1+Ct+qtHt[1+τs+τf ]+
1 +Rm,t
1 + pit
Bm,t−1 = yt(1−τ)+ 1 +Rt
1 + pit
At+(1−δ+τf )qtHt−1+Bm,t
(2)
The left-hand side of this budget constraint (in real terms) contains the outflow of funds:
the real value of non-mortgage financial assets carried over into the next period (At+1),
consumption, purchases of housing stock (qtHt), and expenditures on mortgage loans (Rm,t
is the nominal yield on mortgage-secured loans). The right-hand side includes the inflow of
funds: real income (yt) after tax (τ is the income tax rate), the current holdings of non-
mortgage financial assets (Rt denotes the nominal interest rate on this), the value of the
housing stock net of depreciation (at rate δ), and new mortgage borrowing. pit = Pt/Pt−1−1
denotes the inflation rate. τs and τf are taxes on housing stock and flow. The flow tax is
defined by τf (qtHt − (1 − δ)qtHt−1), while the stock tax is τsqtHt. Following Lastrapes [7],
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we impose the mortgage borrowing constrain:
Bm,t = γqtHt, γ ∈ (0, 1) (3)
where γ is the loan-to-value ratio.
In the following part, we will obtain the first order conditions in solving the model, and
derive the housing demand equation. To simplify, we substitute (3) into (2) to eliminate
Bm,t. Thus, the consumer chooses Ct, At+1, and Ht to maximize (1) subject to (2). Let λt
be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the mortgage constraint (3). The first order
conditions are:
∂Ct : UC,t = λt (4)
∂At+1 : λt+1
1 +Rt+1
1 + pit+1
− λt = 0 (5)
∂Ht : UH,t − λtqt(1 + τf + τs − γ)− λt+1(1 +Rm,t+1
1 + pit+1
γqt + (1 + τf )(1− δ)qt+1) = 0 (6)
where Ux,t is the partial derivative of U with respect to x (x = C,H). Substituting (4) and
(5) into (6) to eliminate the multipliers and making some obvious approximations for the
ratios of interest rates, then obtain
UC,t
UH,t
= qt[θ + (1 +Rm,t+1 −Rt+1)γ]− qt+1[(1 + τf )(1− δ)−Rt+1 + pit+1] (7)
where θ = 1− γ + τf + τs. Set the utility function U in a Cobb-Douglas fashion:
U(Ht, Ct) = α log(Ct) + (1− α) log(Ht) (8)
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Besides, divide Ct and Ht by Nt. Then rewrite (7) as
(
1− α
α
)
ct
ht
= qt[θ + (1 +Rm,t+1 −Rt+1)γ]− qt+1((1 + τf )(1− δ)−Rt+1 + pit+1) (9)
where ct = Ct/Nt and ht = Ht/Nt. We assume that log(ct) is constant, then take logs on
(9) to solve for qt. Then, we apply the first order Taylor approximation on the log functions
to obtain the log-linear housing demand equation (for more details, see the appendix in
Lastrapes [7]):
log(qt) = K1 − w1 log(ht) + w2 log(qt+1) + w3(Rt+1 −Rm,t+1)− w2(Rt+1 − pit+1) (10)
where K1 collects all constants, and r = R−pi. The values of w1, w2, and w3 are determined
by the steady state of the housing market equilibrium, which are given as
w1 =
(1−α
α
) c
h
(1−α
α
) c
h
+ ((1− δ)(1 + τf )− r)q , w2 = 1− w1, w3 =
(1 +Rm −R)β
(1 +Rm −R)β + θ (11)
where we drop the t subscript to denote the steady-state value of a particular variable. The
equation (10) defines the housing demand.
Next, we define the supply equation following the work of Mankiw and Weil [11]. Assume
that gross investment in housing is taken to be an increasing function of the real housing
price qt and proportional to the scale of the economy as measured by the population Nt:
∆Ht = ψ(qt)Nt − δHt, ψ′ > 0 (12)
Let nt be the rate of growth of the population Nt, nt =
∆Nt
Nt
. To simplify, we set ψ(qt) =
κqt. Then, we rewrite (12) terms of ht. Differentiating Ht/Nt with respect to time and
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substituting gives
ht+1 − ht = κqt − (n+ δ)ht (13)
Thus, the population growth nt is added into the housing model. Equations (10) and (13)
determine the partial equilibrium dynamics of the housing market.
3. Simulation Results
In this section, we calibrate the parameters to the real data in China and stimulate the
model to simulate the dynamics of price response. By simulating the theoretical model, we
can quantitatively assess the effects of housing taxes on the responses of real housing price
to interest rate and population shocks.
3.1. Parameter Calibration
To perform the simulation, we solve the steady state of the housing market equilibrium
using the parameter values set to match the economic data from China.3 We set the values
of q, h, n, and pi to be 1, 1, 1%, and 3%, respectively. The steady state (annual) nominal
interest rate R and Rm are 5% and 8%. The ratio
c
h
is set to be 0.267. α, γ, and δ are
set at 0.85, 0.8, and 0.02, respectively. κ is decided by equation (13) in steady state. The
exogenous shocks are assumed to follow AR(1) processes4, which are described as:
ln(Rt) = (1− ρR) ln(R) + ρR ln(Rt−1)− eR,t (14)
ln(nt) = (1− ρn) ln(n) + ρn ln(nt−1) + en,t (15)
3We carry out the simulations by Dynare software with Matlab. The parameters are obtained from the
China’s economic data.
4As we can see, the shock to interest rate is negative. The reason for this is that we want to produce a
positive response of housing price to interest rate shocks. As we know, a decrease in the interest rate leads
to an increase in the housing price, which is also tested in the simulation results.
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where eR,t and en,t are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) processes with con-
stant variances σ2R and σ
2
n. In the simulations, we set ρR = ρn = 0.8 and σ
2
R = σ
2
n = 0.01.
At each round, we change the values of τs and τf , and calculate the values of K1, w1, w2
and w3 according to their definitions. Table 1 summarizes the values and definitions of the
parameters used for simulation.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter q h n pi R Rm c/h α γ δ κ K1 w1, w2, w3
Description 1 1 1% 3% 5% 8% 0.267 0.85 0.8 0.02 Eq. (13) Eq. (10) Eq. (11)
3.2. Results
Figures 1-6 represent the simulation results. As we can see from these figures, a nega-
tive shock to interest rate increases the housing price, which matches the empirical results
from the literature. A rising population means an increasing demand for housing. As a
consequence, the positive shocks lead to a positive response of housing price in China.
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Figure 1: Responses of housing price to interest rate shock (different τs)
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Figure 2: Responses of housing price to interest rate shock (different τf )
Turning to the effects of the housing taxes, from Figures 1 and 2, we can see that raising
the rates of flow or stock tax causes more housing price volatilities when facing the interest
rate shock, which implies that both the tax tools are making things worse rather than
improving the situation.
Worse results can be found in Figure 3 if we take the two tax tools together. The
results show that both types of housing taxes contribute to generating more volatilities of
housing price, and that their effects are mutually reinforcing. This implies that housing tax
instruments are not proper ways to regulate the housing market if the housing market boom
is driven by the low interest rate.
However, if housing prices are affected by the population growth shocks, the results are
quite different. Figure 4 shows that changing the rate of stock tax has no effect on the
housing price. But in Figure 5, a higher housing flow tax rate reduces volatility of the
housing price.
We also find the same result in Figure 6, where we implement both tax measures. Simi-
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Figure 3: Responses of housing price to interest rate shock (different τs,f )
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Figure 4: Responses of housing price to population growth shock (different τs)
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Figure 5: Responses of housing price to population growth shock (different τf )
larly, the effects of the two housing tax instruments can be mutually reinforcing. As a result,
in the case where the housing price boom is caused by the positive population shock, raising
the rate of flow tax is a good choice to stabilize the housing market.
Therefore, there are two main findings: First, facing the shock of interest rate, applying
the stock or flow housing tax is just to make the situation worse, namely, both the tax tools
lead to bigger response of housing price. Second, the flow housing tax is effective in the
housing market facing positive shock from the population growth.
4. Conclusions
From the existing literature, interest rate and population growth shocks are two key
drivers of the housing price movements in China. In this paper, we propose a theoretical
model that considers both the population and interest rate shocks in one framework, and
incorporate the housing tax into this model. After that, we carry out numerical simulations.
Our simulation results answer the two questions:
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Figure 6: Responses of housing price to population growth shock (different τs,f )
One, do housing taxes work? The answer is that the effect of housing tax depends on
what shock the market is affected by. Different shocks need different policy measures. The
policy makers should not depend on a single tool to regulate the housing market since there
are different shocks influencing the housing market. As a result, the policy makers should
not jump in with a quick and easy solution, without having spent time to first understand
and then carefully analyze the sources of shocks in the housing market.
Two, will the effects of housing tax tools be different facing different driving forces of
the housing price movements in China? The results suggest that only the flow tax works in
the situation where the housing price volatility is caused by the population growth shock.
If the shock comes from interest rate, it will make things worse if we conduct the housing
taxes. Therefore, our work provides little support for Shanghai and Chongqing cities to
impose house property taxes on individual housing. Without the critical understanding of
the different sources of shocks, such taxes would be the seemingly simple and easy solutions,
but to the wrong problem.
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